CURRENT MISSION research, teaching, and sailing ABOUT ME Currently, I work as a Guest Professor at the University of Bayreuth, Germany. I also work as a Research Fellow and an Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Vienna. Before, (i) I finished my PhD (i.e 'DPhil') at the University of Oxford in Philosophy and (ii) worked as a research fellow at the University of Oslo. My PhD thesis is on 'The Nature of Rationality'. When I am not busy with my work or mission, I try to combine teaching with traveling by working as a guest lecturer in Central and Eastern Europe. I'm often asked what my thesis is about. Here's a short description: Rationality requires many things of us. In rough formulation, rationality, for example, requires you not to believe contradictions; it requires you to believe what logically follows from your believes; it requires you to take the means necessary to your ends; it requires you to do or to intend to do what you believe you ought to do; it requires you to have transitive preferences; etc. On this list, every individual requirement is contentions or at least debated. That is, there is a debate about the length and content of the list of rationality requirements. However, my thesis is not aiming to become a part of this debate. The requirements I specify just serve as examples. Instead, I am interested in some of the (philosophically significant) properties or features of the requirements of rationality. I’m interested in their logical form (i.e. their 'scope'), their modal status (i.e. whether they are necessary or not), how we can satisfy or avoid violating them, whether we are necessarily able to do what rationality requires of us, whether all of some of these requirements are normative, etc etc. PHILOSOPHY Here are some of my philosophical commitments. They are randomly organised: (i) Truth is a content-related property of propositions; (ii) in general, don't construe the truth of a proposition as being dependent on who asserts it; (iii) assess the value of truth in the light of it being fundementally a property of propositions. (I say that truth is 'fundamentally' a property of a proposition, as it may also, for instance, be a property of a belief. But it's a property of a belief only in a derivative sense in that the 'truth' of a belief corresponds to the truth its content (i.e. a proposition); (iv) not every gramatically sound sentence is a proposition (v) you cannot correctly assert 'there is/are X' unless 'X' exists in an ontologically sound sense; (vi) ... "Greed has poisoned men’s souls, has barricaded the world with hate, has goose-stepped us into misery and bloodshed. We have developed speed but we have shut ourselves in. Machinery that gives abundance has left us in want. Our knowledge has made us cynical, our cleverness hard and unkind. We think too much and feel too little. More than machinery, we need humanity. More than cleverness, we need kindness and gentleness. Without these qualities, life will be violent and all will be lost." (Charlie Chaplin) "When I read about the evils of drinking, I gave up reading." (Henny Youngman)